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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
W. E. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff ,and Appellant,
vs.
H. R. ESPEY,
Defendant,
and
J. H. MORGAN, SR.
Defendant and
Cross-Appellant.

Case No. 9251

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND
CROSS-AP'PELLANT, J. H. MORGAN, SR.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
To aid the Court the respondent and cross-appellant Morgan will likewise refer to the transcript
by the letter "R' and to the parties as in the court
below.
This brief will encompass both an answer to
appellant's brief and the cross appeal of the defendant Morgan. As to each subject a statement
of points will be separately set forth.
1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In most respects the plaintiff's statement of
facts is acceptable to the defendant Morgan. There
are some material statements made, however, that
are not supported by the testimony and exhibits,
and in fact are contrary to the evidence adduced
at the trial. Also, additional facts are necessary to
properly present the picture to this court.
The defendant Morgan especially objects to the
factual statement at page 3 of plaintiff's brief
wherein it is stated:
"However, when plaintiff pointed out
the options contained in the agreement and
attempted to exercise the option to purchase
the additional 2500 shares of White Canyon
Mining Company stock at 80 cents per share,
the defendant Morgan refused to make any
payment and indicated to plaintiff that the
agreement in his opinion was usurious and
plaintiff left Morgan's office without any
satisfaction either by \vay of cash or stock.
(R. 47-49)"
The above referred to pag·es do not support
such a factual statement. The record is clear that
defendant Morgan offered to pay the note (R. 48.
R. 69-70. R. 79. R. 83. R. 120-121.) Morgan paid
into court $2,681.55 on November 4, 1955. (R. 14.)
The quoted statement fron1 plaintiff's brief
is also misleading, unfounded, a11d contrary to the
facts which are that at the time the plai11tiff can1e
2
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to see the defendant Morgan, purportedly to exercise the option for 2500 shares of White Canyon
Mining Company stock, the plaintiff was actually
asking for 10,000 shares of White Canyon Mining
Company stock and not just the 2500 shares as
set forth in plaintiff's statement of facts. The facts
are that plaintiff was demanding the 7500 shares
in addition to the 2500 shares. (R. 66-67. R. 78. R.
84. R. 95. R. 120-121.) As testified to by plaintiff
( R. 51. ) , plain tiff's counsel was authorized to write
and did send to defendant's Ex. P-5, from which
we quote:
"Demand is hereby made upon you for
delivery of 7500 shares of White Canyon Mining Company stock in lieu of payment of the
above mentioned note and further demand is
hereby made for an additional 2500 shares
of White Canyon Mining Company stock at
the purchase price of 80¢ per share, totaling
$2000, which amount I am authorized to pay
you upon recr.ipt of 10,000 shares of said
stock.''
Morgan's testimony is completely consonant
with the contents of Ex. P-5 which, as above noted,
was written and sent by plaintiff's counsel. Morgan
testified:
"The conversation took place as Mr. Williams stated after I told him that I would pay
the $2500.00 note and interest and then he
said, 'What about the stock?' We had the
contract out at that time and he said he wanted the 7500 shares and the 2500 shares. The
3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2500 shares he was willing to pay the eighty
cents a share if I would deliver him the 10,000
shares. He put it just about the same way as
Mr. Boyle put it in his letter; that they ~anted
delivery of the 10,000 shares. I told h1m that
I was holding that stock as trustee for Mr.
Espey; that if I should deliver him the 7500
shares, Mr. Espey could sue me because I
was holding it in trust for him; that the only
thing I could do was to let him exercise his
option if he wanted to on the 2500 shares at
eighty cents. He didn't want to exercise his
option on the 2500 shares unless I would deliver him the full 10,000 shares. (R. 95.)
Moreover, plaintiff was willing to loan defendant Espey money upon proper safeguards, for he
testified:
''If you could get someone whom I know
or know of and know that they are good for
it, I \vould possibly make the loan." (R. 43.)
Additionally, it is a fact that the defendant
Morgan had never met the plaintiff until some four
to ten days after the note had becon1e due. (R. 47.
R. 55. R. 58.) The defendant Morgan 'vas an accomnlodation endorser and did 11ot receive any portion of the $2,500.00 loaned by the plaintiff to the
defendant Espey. (R. 67. R.118).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POI~T

I.
TI-IERE IS NO ERROR IN THE FIXl)JNG OF THE
TRIAL COURT THAT TI-IE 7500 SHARES OF ''THITE
CANYON STOCI{ WERE HELD BY THE DEFENDANT
MORGAN AS SECURITY ONLY.
4
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POINT II.
EVEN IF THE 7'500 SHARES OF STOCK WERE
NOT HELD AS SECURITY, PLAINTIFF MUST NEVERTHELESS FAIL UNDER HIS THEORY, SINCE MORGAN ELECTED TO PAY THE NOTE RATHER THAN
DELIVER THE SHARES.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THERE IS NO ERROR IN THE FINDING OF THE
TRIAL COURT THAT THE 7500 SHARES OF WHITE
CANYON STOCK WERE HELD BY THE DEFENDANT
MORGAN AS SECURITY ONLY.

Plaintiff contends by his appeal that he can
parlay a loan of $2,500.00 for five months into
$16,780.00, and this amount to be charged to a defendant (Morgan) who did not receive five cents
of the $2,500.00 loaned by plaintiff. Assuming the
facts and law would support such a harvest, it is
shocking. Fortunately, neither the facts nor the law
will permit it.
Plaintiff in his brief asumes that the 7500
shares was a pledge and then proceeds to say it
was not a pledge because possession was never delivered to plaintiff. The defendant Morgan is not
overly concerned as to what type of security the
7500 shares constituted. Possibly the shares did
constitute a pledge~ If so, did not the plaintiff and
all parties select and agree that Morgan would be
the pledge holder? How more clearly could they have
done this than by their execution of the agreement,
5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Ex. P-1. The law is cognizant of such a delivery
to a depository or pledge holder. See 41 Am. Jur.
599, wherein it is stated:
"In order to perfect the contract of
pledge, the delivery need not be made !o the
creditor himself; it will be sufficient 1f the
thing pledged is placed in the hands of a third
person who l1as been chosen by debtor and
creditor to hold for the creditor, provided
such third person kno,vs of the trust and accepts the obligation which it imposes."
See also C.J.S. at page 23 wherein it is stated:
"Such third person may be agent, clerk
or servant of the pledgeor."
The fundamental and basic question is whether
or not the 7500 shares were held as security. They
n1ay have taken the form of a chattel mortgage, a
bailment, trust, trust receipt, or it may have been
that they were the subject of an equitable lien. In
this regard, see generally 33 Am. Ju·r. 427, wherein
it is stated:
"An equitable lien is a right, not recognized at law, to haYe a fund or specific property, or its proceeds, applied in whole or
in part to the payment of a particular debt
or class of debts. It is 11ot an estate of property in the t~ing· itself,_ noF i~ it a right to
rec?ver the thing, tl~at Is, It Is not a right
which may be the basis of a possessory action
but it is merely a charge upon it. Such a lie~
may be created by an express contact which
shows an intention to charge so1ne particular
property with a debt or obligation, or it may
6
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arise by implication from the relations and
dealings of the parties whose interests are
involved. Likewise, a lien may be created by
an equitable assignment of a contract, debt,
or fund. In fact, if a transaction resolves itself into a security, whatever may be its
form and whatever name the parties may
choose to give it, it is in equity a lien. Possession by the lienor of the thing sought to be
charged is not essential to the existence of
an equitable lien, which differs in this respect
from a common-law lien."
C.J.S. defines equitable liens as follows, page

836:
"The essential elements of an Equitable
Lien include a debt, duty or obligation owing
by one person to another, and a res to which
that obligation fastens. An Equitable Lien
may arise from an express contract whereby a
party promises to transfer, or indicates an
intent to charge a particular property as
security for an obligation. No special form
of contract is essential, provided the intent of
the parties to create a lien is clearly expressed.''
Utah recognizes the equitable lien doctrine. See
Olsen vs. Kidman, 120 Utah 443, 2'35 P. 2d 510.
To determine the status of the 7500 shares,
the contract and note, Ex. P-1 and P-2, respectively,
must be examined. The contract has in the recital
paragraph that first parties (the defendants) are
to receive 50,000 shares of White Canyon Mining
Company stock; and second party (the plaintiff)
7
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shall make a $2500.00 loan to defendant Espey.
By paragraph 1, defendant Espey agrees to
execute a note for $2500.00 plus interest for a period
of five months. In this same paragraph the agreement provides:
"To secure said note, Espey authorizes
Morgan to hold for him in trust 7500 shares
... to be delivered to second party upon failure to pay the note when due."
Then the agreement at paragraph 2 commences:
"For making said loan, second party may
choose one of three following options."
The options are lettered "A" "B" and "C"
'
'
'
and the first two refer to Coyote claims and "C"
grants an option to White Canyon stock. In addition to the above three options, the agreement states:
"A11 additional consideration for said
Ioan . . . ''
And this relates to the particular 2500 shares of
'Vhite Canyon Mining Company stock, which are
partially the subject of this litigation and oftentimes referred to as the option stock.
It is to be r2adily noted that the agreement
Yery clearly separates the 11ote and 7500 shares of
stock contained in parag·raph 1 from the option
stock which is contained in parag·rapl1 2. Observe
that paragraph 2 con1n1ences: ''For n1aking said
loan ... " and there is give11 under this paragraph
the options lettered "A" , "B" , and "C" . These options, in other words, were the consideration for
8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the making of the loan. Observe also that the ag·reement states, "An aditional consideration for said
loan . . . " and there it is just as the parties intended, the plaintiff was granted the further option
to acquire 2500 shares upon paying 80 cents per
share.
The 7500 shares of White Canyon stock are
tied in solely and exclusively with the note and, in
fact, the agreement states that they are "to secure
said note." And so the agreement, under any reasonable interpretation, shows an intent to separate
the option stock from the security stock which was
tied to the note.
As an aid to the construction and interpretation we need not entirely be confined to the four
corners of the agree1nent. Certainly the note, Ex. P-2,
should be considered. The note is in the normal form
and the last sentence provides:
"If this note or interest is not paid as
agreed, the undersigned jointly and severally
agree to pay all costs incurred and such reasonable attorney's fees as may be allowed by
court upon the actual foreclosure of the security or upon entry of judgment."
Thus, the note clearly spells out what was to
be done with the security if default occurred .
The agreement and note are plainly susceptible
to only one reasonable interpretation. They clearly
show that the parties understood the difference
9
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between a security transaction and option for a
sale. There are no provisions for forfeiture or liquidated damages.
Since there are no words of sale pertaining to
the 7500 shares of stock qualifying the manifest proYisions that said shares are held as security, plaintiff's claim that he is entitled to all of it in absolute
appropriation to satisfaction of the debt must be
found in some rule of law. Plaintiff has quoted no
such law, and our search has revealed no such rule.
The cases are numerable holding that a creditor is
entitled to satisfaction of the debt and he can look
to the security for satisfaction, but that he would be
required to account to the debtor for any surplus
above the obligation and proper expenses, and upon
payment or tender before sale of the security, the
lie11 upon the security is discharged. Lilenquist v.
l~tah State Savings Bank, 99 Utah 163, 100 P. 2d.
185; Hyams v. Ba·mberger, 10 Utah 336 P. 2d 202.
The Lilenquist case, supra, quotes with approval the
text of R.C.L. found in 41 Am. Jur., Pledges and Collateral Sec1trity, Sec. 74:
"The rule is settled in 1nost jurisdictions
that upon the tender of the an1ount of the debt
for which the property is pledged, either upon
the day of the n1aturity, or thereafter before
the property has been lawfully sold by the
pledgee, the lien of the pledgee is destroyed
and an action will lie in favor of the pledgeor'
against the pledgee if the I'atter refuses t~
10
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deliver up the pledge, and it is usually held
that it is not necessary that the pledgeor
should keep the tender good in order to maintain the action."
The plaintiff, in his efforts to avoid the obviously correct finding of the trial court that the
7500 shares were held as security for the note, has
been forced to contend th'at in reality the option
lay with the defendants as to whether they wolild
pay the note at matu1·ity or deliver the stock. See
page 12, plaintiff's brief. To support this strained
contention, the plaintiff argues at page 13 of his
brief; that it was his understanding that if the stock
had gone down in value, the defendants could have
satisfied their obligation insofar as the $2500.00
loan was concerned by delivering 7500 shares of
stock; that even though the stock might be worth
less than $2500.00 at the time the note was due,
still, plaintif was willing to take the gamble of such
a transaction because of the hope that the stock
would subsequently achieve a substantial increase
in value.
In making this argument, reliance is placed
upon the testimony of the plaintiff as to what was
his understanding of the agreement. The purported
understanding was never communicated or divulged
to defendant Morgan and, although repeated and
strenuous objection was made to the admisison of
this testimony during the course of the trial, never11
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theless the evidence was admitted. In view of the
court's finding, there is no need to comment further
on this, except to point out that even this argument
by plaintiff seems exactly contrary to the following testimony by plaintiff elicited during cross examination: ( R. 70.)
"Q. If the stock had only been worth
ten cents a share and Mr. Morgan had put
on a good act, that would have been all right
with you?
A. It probably would have because if
Mr. Morgan actually had of insisted that I
take this White Canyon stock, I would have no
doubt have taken the money, would have insisted on having the money.
Q. You testified that he wanted to giYe
you a check for the $2500.00 and you saidA. He wanted to give me a check for
$2500.00, that is correct.
Q. So you were going to just wait for
Mr. Morgan and were going to go the other
way, is that right?
A. In effect~ that 'vay, yes.
Returning to the plaintiff's conte11tion that the
defendants had the option of payi11g· the note when
due, or, in lieu thereof, delivering the stock, \Ve are
compelled to wonder where in the agT·een1ent there
is any consideration g·ranting· defendants this right,
or if defendants were accorded such an option, lvould
not the parties have so stated in the agreement?
12
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The fact that there were options in the agreement involving Coyote claims and White Canyon
stock also completely discredits any such contention
by plaintiff. Under option "C" the plaintiff, and
only the plaintiff, can elect to take 2500 shares of
White Canyon stock and forg·ive $1250.00 of the
debt. Under option "B" the plaintiff, and only the
plaintiff, could elect to cancel $1250.00 and accept
instead 2 fi, interest in the Coyote District clain1s.
The only logical result of plaintiff's argument is that
options "B" and ''C" would have been eliminated
if defendants had elected to discharge the $2500.00
obligation by delivering the 7500 'shares of White
Canyon stock which conceivably could have only
been worth, at the time of delivery, ten cents a share.
This wotlld seem to follow, since there would no
longer have been any $2500.00 obligation against
which the plaintiff could have chosen to cancel
$1250.00 in exchange for Coyote claims (option
"B") or White Canyon Mining Company stock ( option "C") .
This, to the defendant's mind, points out rather
vividly the compelled conclusion that the agreement
is susceptible of only one reasonable interpretation.
The agreement covers two subjects, one, a note
which is secured by 7500 shares of stock, and the
other subject refers to various stock options. It is
a well accepted rule of law that in the interpre13
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tation of written instruments the intent so expressed is to be found, if possible, within the four corners of the instrument itself in accordance with
the ordinary accepted meaning of the words used.
(Ephraim Theatre Co. vs. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163,
321 P. 2d 221.)
The intent of a contract is to be ascertained
from the four corners of the instrument itself, and
if ambiguity can be reconciled from a reasonable
interpretation of the instrument, extrinsic evidence
should not be allowed. (Continental Bank and Trust
Co. v. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 306 P. 2d 773).
Here, as we have pointed out, to interpret this
agreement as in reality granting the right to defendants to pay the note at maturity or deliver the
7500 shares, could result in rendering the language
of options "B" and "C" useless and meaningless.
As we have heretofore stated, the defendant is
not particularly concerned as to the nature of the
security. At 41 Am. J1tr. p. 584, it is stated:
"The solution of the question whether a
transaction shall be treated as having the
characteristics of one form of security rather
than the other often 1nust depe11d on the showing as to the intention and conduct of the
parties. This intention or conduct is ascertained from ~he whole instrun1ent evidencing
the transaction, and not from particular
words therein. Thus, the fact that the word
"pledge" is en1ployed in an instrun1ent e'ridencing a transaction does not conclusively
14
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determine its character, but the rule is that
even where this word is used, if it appears
that it is the clear intent of the parties that
the possession of the subject matter is to remain in the debtor and the possession does
so remain, the transaction may be held to
be a mortgage."
And later, at p. 585, it is stated:
"Unless there is some evidence tendi11g
to show an intention on the part of the debtor
to give, and also on the part of the creditor to
recieve, the property in satisfaction of the
debt, either in whole or in part, the law presumes that it is given only as a collateral
security. Especially does this presumption
arise if the property give11 was itself a chose
in action or a security of a different nature
from the debt, whose value was neither intrinsic nor apparent, and was not agreed
upon by the parties."
This authority also cites with approval Casey
v. Cavaroc, 96 US 467, 24 L. ed. 779 and Am. Law
Inst. Restatement, Security, Sec. 10, as authority
for the proposition that:
"A contra'ct which is intended as a pledge
of property is enforceable betvveen the parties, although there has been no delivery of
possession, provided there is a proper subject matter, a debt or engagement, and a
meeting of the minds of tl1e parties that the
subject matter shall be handed over to secure
the payment or fulfillment of the debt or
engagement."
By any test of conduct of these parties as to
15
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the 7500 shares of stock it is clear that a security
transaction was intended' and created. The plaintiff
said he would be willing to make a loan if a responsible party would sign. He accepted Morgan a'S such
a party and obtained his signature. The note and
agreen1ent, Ex. P-1 and P-2, as pointed out, created
a security transaction, and not as plaintiff contends,
a l~ight to demand appropriation of 7500 shares of
stock to satisfy the debt. The state of the oral testin1ony by the parties leads to the ·same conclusion.
POINT II.
EVEN IF THE 7500 SHARES OF STOCK WERE
NOT HELD AS SECURITY, PLAINTIFF MUST NEY"ERTHELESS FAIL UNDER HIS THEORY, SINCE l\1:0RGAN ELECTED TO PAY THE NOTE RATHER THAN
DELIVER THE SHARES.

Although the defenda11t Morgan does not concede the ill-founded theory of plaintiff to the
effect that by the agreement defendants were given
the option of either paying the note at maturity or
delivering the stock, nevertheless, even under such
a theory it would appear that plaintiff must fail;
and this for the plain and obvious reason that if
such an election resided in the defe11dant Morgan,
he made the election to pay the note a11d 11ot deliYer
the 7500 shares. ''Te have previously referred to
ntnnerous instances in the record 'vhere Morgan
tendered payment of the note and 'viii not acrain
b
detail these.
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The trial court found that Morgan tendered
payment of the note. There is ample evidence for
such a finding, and indeed, no other finding could
haYe been made in the light of the evidence. And,
of course, it is elemental that the trial court's judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless there
is insuficient evidence to support it, or unless there
is a prejudicial error of law.
In summation, the defendant submits that clearly the 7500 shares vvere held as security; that if they
were not so held, then even though plaintiff's theory
is adopted, which would give defendants the option
of paying the note or delivering the stock; nevertheless, the tender of payment by Morgan constituted an election on his part not to deliver the stock.
And in neither event can there be any basis for an
action of conversion. And if there was no conversion, the damages claimed by plaintiff are, of course,
immaterial.
CROSS

APPEAL

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT,
AND CONTRARY TO, THE FINDING OF THE COURT
THAT PLAINTIFF EXERCISED THE OPTION TO ACQUIRE 2500 SHARES OF WHITE CANYON MINING
CO::\IP ANY STOCK.
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POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT,
AND CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT
THAT DEFENDANT J. H. MORGAN, SR. WRONG]:4-,ULLY REFUSED TO SELL 2500 SHARES OF WHITE
CANYON MINING COMPANY STOCK TO PLAINTIFF
AT THE AGREED PRICE 'OF 80 CENTS A SHARE.
POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT,
AND CONTRARY TO, THE FINDING OF THE COURT
THAT PLAINTIFF IS REASONABLY ENTITLED TO
ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THIS MATTER, AND THAT
FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS IS A REASONABLE FEE
THEREFOR.
POINT IV.
THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE !~
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT OF
DAMAGE TO PLAINTIFF AS THE SAME RELATES
TO THE 2500 SHARES OF WHITE CANYON ::\liNING COMPANY STOCK.
POINT V.
THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE !~
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE A'\TARD OF FIVE
HUNDRED DOLLARS ATTORNEY'S FEES TO PLAIKTIFF.
POINT VI.
ASSUMING, ALTHOUGH DENIED BY THIS DEFENDANT, THAT PLAINTIFF EXERCISED THE OPTION TO ACQUIRE THE 2500 SHARES OF WHITE
CANYON MINING COMPANY STOCK; E\~EN SO, THE
JUDGMENT IS AGAINST LA\Y, IN THAT PLAINTIFF, BY HIS INITIAL COMPLAINT, l\fADE AN ELECTION OF REMEDIES AND SHOULD NOT BE PERlVIITTED TO DEPART FROM HIS ELECTION BY
AMENDING THE COMPLAINT AND TRYING THE
CASE ON A SUBSEQUENT THEORY OF CONVERSION.
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POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT,
AND CONTRARY TO, THE FINDING OF THE COURT
THAT PLAINTIFF EXERCISED THE OPTION TO ACQUIRE 2500 S·HARES OF WHITE CANYON MINING
CO:JIPANY STOCK.

An option is merely an offer which cannot be
\vithdrawn for a spe·cified period of time. See Williston on Contracts, Section 61, and to be binding
the offer must be accepted according to the terms
of the offer \vithout imposing new conditions. Willistau on Contracts, Sec. 73, Restatement of Contracts,
Sec. 59 and 60.
The above is so fundamental that no additional authority need be cited. And thus we are left
\vith the 'Sole question as to whether, bearing in
mind that the burden was upon the plaintiff, has
the plaintiff as a matter of fact proved, that he
exercised the option according to its terms, and that
the defendant Morgan refused to honor the terms
of the option. For plaintiff to prevail there must
have been an unqualified and unconditional exercise of the option granted. And this would require
the tender of $2000.00 by the plaintiff for 2500
shares of White Canyon Mining Company stock.
This tender to be effective, can in no way be qualified or coupled with any other demand or condition,
as for instance, demand for the 7500 share·s.
The trial court found in paragraphs 4 and 5 of
its findings of fact that plaintiff indicated his de19
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sire to exercise his option to the 2500 shares of
stock in the White Canyon Mining Company by
offering to defendant $2000.00 and that the defendant Morgan refused to sell the 2500 shares to the
plaintiff at the agreed price. Conclusions of law
were accordingly made by the trial court.
The only and ultimate question now presented
is whether or not the findings of fact are contrary
to the evidence. We submit the correct and true facts
are; that the defendant Morgan did not sell the
2500 shares to the plaintiff; that the defendant
Morgan never refused to sell to the plaintiff 2500
shares of stock according to the terms of the option;
that any attempted exercise of the option by plaintiff was always coupled, qualified and conditioned
upon defendant delivering, not only the 2500 shares,
but also the 7500 shares of White Canyon Mining
Company stock.
There are three main sources in the record
from which it can be determined 'vhether the option was exercised and properly or i1nproperly refused. We will quote at lengtl1 from the record as
to these three sources.
First, the plaintiff could not hav·e atte1npted
to exercise the option so far as the defendant Morgan is concerned, until he first met Morga11 ,vhich
was some four to ten days after the due date of the
note. ( R. 46-4 7.) Plain tiff testified as to this first
20
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and only meeting with the defendant Morgan as
follows:
"A. For this meeting we were on, yes,
and I discussed this thing with Mr. Morgan
that Espey had never paid the note and that
he was very shocked; that seemingly appeared
shocked that he hadn't paid it. He said, 'I can't
understand why he hasn't paid it. He has
paid the rest of them. I don't know why he
missed yours.' As I recall this, Mr. Morgan
got on the telephone and tried to find him at
a tourist court or some such a thing. I don't
even recall if he did find him. I don't believe
he did but as I recall he did some of that. He
said, 'Well, Mr. William's, I'll have to pay
this note to you,' and he called his secretary
in and said, 'Give Mr. Williams $2500.00 plus
this 6lfr interest that he has coming to him.'
I told Mr. Morgan that there was other things
in the contract and that- that there was optional stock - various stock options in it and
too that the note had not been paid on time
and that I would expect to get out of this contract those things that I felt that I was entitled to.
Q. Did you discuss particularly the
Coyote interests that are mentioned on the
first page of Exhibit I?
A. Yes, Mr. Morgan pointed at that
and told me that I could have that. As I recall, too, he said, 'It isn't any good but you
can have it.' He said, 'I don't think it would
be any good but you can have it.'
So, I further explained that there was
a couple of other options here that had to do
21
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with White Canyon stock and he said, 'No,'
he said, 'you're not about to get that.'
THE COURT:

I did not hear that.

A. He said, 'No,' or words to the effect
that, 'you are not about' - I think the word
he u·sed, actually used was, "I'll see you in
hell first on that one. You will not get it,' and
I told him that I felt I was entitled to it and
I would have to see an atorney. He told me,
he said, 'It is usury.' I said 'I don't know about
that.' Actually I didn't because I didn't know
what usury was but I would have to see an
attorney and decide.
THE COURT: Now, that was as to
what stock?
THE WITNESS: That has reference,
~our Honor, to the White Canyon stock, yes
s1r.

Q. (By Mr. Boyle) Did he make any
reference as to what a Court might do if you
went to Court?
A. Well, the only reference he had to it,
Mark, was that a Court would call it usury.
I saw an attorney andQ. Excuse me, did you receive any
money?
A. No sir.
Q. And did that tern1inate the conversation?
A. That terminated the conYersation.
Additional testimony by the plaintiff concerning the White Canyon Mining Company stock is to
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be found at R. 66-67. This is the conversation plaintiff purportedly had with defendant Espey, the substance of which was never communicated or divulged to the defendant Morgan.
On cross examination, R. 69-70, almost all of
the testimony pertains to the 7500 shares of stock.
At R. 83, the plaintiff testified:
"Well, Mr. Morgan was very courteous,
and very nice. He, as I before mentioned, offered to pay this $2500.00 plus the interest,
Then, when I talked about the other things
in the contract that I felt that I was entitled
to and got into it, of course, he was - he
didn't mind about Coyote. He told me himself. I knew nothing about Coyote but as I
recall he told me that Coyote was worth nothing anyway but might be and you can have
that but when we got to the White Canyon
deal, that is when Mr. Morgan- he wanted
to know- he wanted no part of that."
Reading the above testimony, it is certainly
clear that plaintiff on none of those occasions tendered $2000.00 for 2500 shares of White Canyon
Mining Company stock. It is true that he testified:
"I told Mr. Morgan that there was other
things in this contract and that- that there
was optioned stock - various stock options
in it and too that the note had not been paid
on time and that I would expect to get out of
this contract those things that I felt that I
was entitled to." (R. 48)
And later:
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"So I further explained that there was
a couple of other options here that had to do
with White Canyon stock." (R. 48)
And further at R. 83:
"I knew nothing about Coyote but as I
recall he told me that Coyote was worth nothing anyway but might be and you can have
that but when we got to the White Canyon
deal that is when Mr. Morgan -he wanted
to know- he wanted no part of that.''
And so as to all of these quoted statements,
there is completely lacking any definite or positive
assertion by plaintiff that he tendered $2,000.00
for the 2500 shares of White Canyon stock.
One thing certainly appears to be true and that
is that when the plaintiff went to the defendant
Morgan's office he didn't have the preconceived
plan of exercising the option to acquire the 2500
shares of White Canyon stock by paying 80 cents
per share. This conclusion is arrived at ,,. hen we
consider the testimony of plaintiff on redirect, R.
83:
''Q. On cross examination you said
it was Mr. Morgan's actions that made
you think the White Canyon stock was valuable for the first tin1e. ''rill you tell the court
just exactly what his actions ''""ere that led
you to this belief?"
The testimony of plaintiff on cross exan1ination at R. 69-70, \\Therein he stated that:
" ... if Mr. Morgan actually had of insisted that I take this White Canyon stock,
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I would have no doubt have taken the money,
would have insisted on having the money,"
also requires the conclusion that certainly during
plaintiff's talk with Morgan he had no preconceived
idea to exercise the option for the 2500 shares of
\Y'hi te Canyon stock.
Another illuminating factor of this transaction
is that by option "C" plaintiff could have acquired
2500 shares of White Canyon stock for 50 cents a
share. It is utterly unreasonable and incomprehensible that plaintiff would tender 80 cents a share
for stock that he could have acquired for 50 cents
a share. The plain fact of the matter is that, regarding the testimony we have so far examined, plaintiff did not tender the 80 cents per 'share for the
2500 shares of White Canyon stock, and thus from
the first source, plaintiff's testimony, there is no
evidence clearly indilcating that the option was exercised.
The second source to which we can look invol\·es an examination of Ex. P-5, which was the
letter plaintiff's attorney wrote to the defendant
on February 18, 1955, and from which we quote in
part:
"Demand is hereby made upon you for
delivery of 7500 shares of White Canyon Mining Company stock in lieu of payment of the
above mentioned note and furthe1· demand is
hereby made for an additional 2500 shares
of White Canyon Mining Company stock at
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the purchase price of 80¢ per sha~e, totaling
$2000, which amount I am authorized to p~y
you upon receipt of 10,000 shares of said
stock."
Now here the key phrase is, "which amount
(and this can only mean the $2000.00) I am authorized to pay you upon receipt of 10,000 shares of
said stock." The letter containing the demand is
clear and unequivocable, a tender of $2000.00 was
made providing 10,000 shares were received. This
was not an unqualified exercise of the option. It
was conditional, the condition being delivery of
10,000 sl1ares and not just the 2500 shares which
were the subject of the option.
The third source can be found in the testimony
of the defendant Morgan at R. 95:

' 'il-

"The conversation took place as Mr.
liams stated after I told him that I would
pay the $2500.00 note and interest and then
he said, 'What about the stock?'. \\re had the
contract out at that time and he said he
wanted the 7500 shares and the 2500 shares.
The 2500 shares he was willing to pay the
eighty cents a share if I would deliYer him
the 10,000. He put it just about the same way
as Mr. Boyle put it in his letter; that they
wanted delivery of the 10,000 shares. I told
him that I was holding the stocl\: as trustee
for Mr. Espey; that if I should deliver him
the 7500 shares, Mr. Espey could sue me because I was holding it in trust for hin1 · that
the only thing I could do was to let hi~1 exercise his option if he wanted to on the 2500
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shares at eighty cents. He didn't want to
exercise his option on the 2500 shares unless
I would deliver him the full 10,000 shares."
It is submitted that a reading of the testimony
of the plaintiff and defendant and examination of
Ex. P-5 fails to show the plaintiff exercised the
option for 2500 shares, and in fact compels the conclusion that the option was not exercised. If the
option was not exercised, there can of course be
no finding that Morgan wrongfully refused to sell
the 2500 shares, and it follows that there is no basis
to support the judgment of damage to the plaintiff
as the same relates to the said shares.
Points II and IV are primarily ·covered by the
argument previously made and no further argun1ent will be submitted as to these.
POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT,
AND CONTRARY TO, THE FINDING OF THE COURT
THAT PLAINTIFF IS REASONABLY ENTITLED TO
ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THIS MATTER, AND THAT
FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS IS A REASONABLE FEE
THEREFOR.

Defendant Morgan endorsed the promissory note
for the accommodation of Espey, and, as he stated,
he did not receive one cent from the loan. He is an
acco1nmodation party under definition of the Law
of Negotiable Instruments, 44-1-30, U.C.A., 1953,
and \vas entitled to notice before he could be in default. 44-1-91, U.C.A., 1953. All of the evidence is;
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that upon notice to defendant Morgan that the maker
Espey had not paid the note on its maturity date,
defendant promptly tendered principal and interest
to the holder plaintiff. There is no evidence to the
contrary.
Having made a valid tender, and not being in
default, defendant is not liable to pay attorney's
fees for enforcement of the note nor for interest
accruing after the tender. See 11 C.J.S. sec. 726
P~age 27 4, holding:
"There is no liability for attorney's fees
when the amount due on the instrument has
been tendered.'' (citing cases).
47 C.J.S., INTEREST, sec 52, p. 63,
''The valid tender of the amount of the
principal debt prevents the running of interest.'' (citing cases)
Curiously, the trial court found that the defendant Morgan had tendered payment of the note,
but then inconsistently, it was also found that plaintiff was entitled to $500.00 attorney's fees. The
award of attorney's fees can only be predicated
upon the note, and if tender of payment was made
upon demand, the award of attorney's fees cannot
be supported. Point V relates to the same subject
matter and is submitted without further argument.
Both upon principle and authority the Lower
Court's judgment awarding interest and attorney's
fees on the note should be reversed, and the Lower
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c~ourt

should be directed to modify the judgment
to allow principal and interest to the date of tender
only.
POINT VI.
.:\SSUl\IING, ALTHOUGH DENIED BY THIS DEFENDANT, THAT PLAINTIFF EXERCISED THE OPTIO~ TO ACQUIRE THE 2500 SHARES OF WHITE
CANYON MINING COMPANY STOCK; EVEN SO, THE
JUDGMENT IS AGAINST LAW, IN THAT PLAINTIFF, BY HIS INITIAL COMPLAINT, MADE AN ELECTION OF REMEDIES AND SHOULD NOT BE PER1\IITTED TO DEPART FROM HIS ELECTION BY
Al\IENDING T'HE COMP·LAINT AND TRYING THE
CASE ON A SUBSEQUENT THEORY OF CONVERSION.

Plaintiff by his original complaint, filed on or
about March 18, 1955, demanded that defendants
deliver title to 7500 shares and 2500 shares of White
Canyon Mining Company stock. It is submitted that
this action as initially filed, clearly amounts to an
action in the nature of replevin. The plaintiff by his
pleading made demand upon defendants for delivery
of the stock and alleged refusal to deliver on the
part of the defendants. The prayer of the complaint
demanded transfer of title and delivery of the 7500
and 2500 shares to plaintiff. Subsequently, the defendants answered the complaint, and the matters
were at issue.
Thereafter, on January 11, 1957, almost two
years later, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint.
By this amended complaint, the theory of recovery
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was drastically changed. The amended complaint,
and the pleading upon which issues have been drawn
now pertains to recovery on a theory of conversion.
The answer of the defendant Morgan plead as a defense the doctrine of election of remedies.
That the plaintiff is now proceeding upon a
theory of conversion is plainly evident from the
amended complaint. Paragraph 8 states:
"Defendants have converted said shares
of stock to their own use and benefit."
And again at paragraph 11 it is plainly evident that the theory is now conversion. It is of course
not even remotely possible that the plaintiff would
dispute the nature of the amended complaint in view
of the brief filed on his behalf.
And so it is submitted that this is exactly the
type of situation to which the doctrine of election
of reme'dies applies. As is generally stated in 18
Am. Jur. at page 129:
"DEFINITION AND NATURE. - ElPction is simply what the term imports - a
choice shown by an overt act between two or
more inconsistent rights, either of which may
be asserted at the will of the chooser alone.
An election of remedies may be defined as the
choosing between two or more different and
coexisting modes of procedure and relief allowed by law on the same state of facts. The
doctrine is applicable where an aggrieved
party has two remedies by which he may enforce inconsistent rights growing out of the
30
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same transaction and, being cognizant of his
legal rights and of such facts as will enable
him to make an intelligent choice, brings his
action by one of the methods. Under such
circumstances, the law says he shall not thereafter adopt the alternate remedy, for a suitor
cannot purstle a remedy which predicates his
case upon one theory of right and thereafter
seek a remedy inconsistent with such prior
proceeding. If he has voluntarily chosen and
carried into effect an appropriate remedy
wjth knowledge of the facts and his rights, he
will not, in general, be allowed to resort afterward to an inconsistent remedy, which would
involve a contradiction of the grounds upon
which he before proceeded."
As stated in 89 C.J.S., page 55'3:
"Trover is the technical name of the action to recover damages for a wrongful conversion of the personal property of another."
We now have a situation in this litigation where
plaintiff instituted an action of replevin, indeed
plaintiff termed the initial complaint, as being one
for specific performance ( R. 6) and then subsequently, over objection of defendant Morgan, amended to plead and thereafter try the case upon a theory
of trover, or, as is more commonly known, conver-

.

Sl0l1.

The doctrine of election of remedies is applicable where remedies of replevin and trover are concerned. In the case of Equitable Trust Company vs.
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Connecticut Brass and Manufacturing Corporation,
C.C.A. 2, 290 F. 712, it is stated at page 725:
"All actions which proceed upon the
theory that title to the property is in the claimant are substantially inconsistent with those
which proceed upon the theory that title is
in the defendant. Thus the remedies of replevin and trover are inconsistent. In one of
them the plaintiff affirms his ownership of
and title to the property seized; in the other
he disaffirms his ownership and title and
sues for the conversion. If a plaintiff elects
to resort to one of these remedies, he thereby
deprives himself of any right to resort to the
other."
The above case was cited with approval in Todd
vs. Duncklee, 94 N.H. 226, 52 Atl. 2d 285. The Tennessee case, Johnston vs. Cincinnati, N.O. and TPR
Company, 146 Tenn. 135, 240 S.W. 428, states
at page 438:
"It is therefore manifest that, if the facts
would have sustained a claim of conversion,
which is not necessary to decide, complainant
in his bill elected to waive that claim by alleging his own ownership of the property, and
asking for its return and for rental or hire
f or 1•ts use . . . "
In Saner vs. Whiteman Lumber Company vs.
Texas and N.O.R. -Co., Texas, 288 S.W. 127, the
court at page 128 stated:
"The court of appeals has correctly held
that the lessor of these rails had a choice of
remedies. It could recover the rails, or pro32
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pPrty itself as per the terms of the contract,
or it could recover their value because of the
convet·sion. But the two remedies are clearly
inconsistent. Both cannot be pursued. One
cannot recover the rails and also their value.
It was necessary to make an election, and lessor made it. Having made this election, it
must abide by it."
There can no longer be any question in Utah
as to when the election is conclusive. Howard vs.
Paulson Co., 41 Ut. 490, 127 Pac. 284 held that
where there was a duty of election as to a particular
remedy, the bringing of an action based upon one
remedy constitutes an irrevocable election in the
absence of mistake of fact or other legal excuse.
The fairness involved in the election of remedies doctrine is brought into sharp focus in this
case. For a period of some 2'2 months the plaintiff
pleaded and relied upon replevin, that is to say he
\Vas seeking the return of the stock. In effect, during this period the plaintiff played the market, and
when the value of White Canyon stock substantially
decreased, see Ex. P-4, he determined to amend his
pleading and proceed on another and inconsistent
theory, namely, trover and conversion.
The defendant J. H. Morgan, Sr. submits with-

out

a~he

previously designated defense of

usury.
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CONCLUSION
In summation, defendant J. H. Morgan, Sr.
submits the following:
The 7500 shares of White Canyon Mining Company stock were held as security, and the decision
of the trial court 1nust be affirmed. If not so held,
then even under plaintiff's theory the defendant
elected the pay the note rather than deliver the stock.
The trial court's decision as to the 2500 shares
must be reversed for the reason that plaintiff never
exercised the option to purchase such shares, or if
the option was exercised, plaintiff by his initial
complaint made an irrevocable election to sue in
replevin and thus was precluded from thereafter
amending and proceeding in trover and conversion.
The trial court's award of $500.00 attorney's
fees is clearly in error and must be reversed, since
defendant tendered payment of the note.
The lower court should be directed to modify
the judgment so as to award interest to the date of
tender only.
Respectfully submitted,
MULLINER, PRINCE
and MANGUM
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